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One Up on Wall Street

How to Use What You Already Know to Make Money in the Market | 2/EFireside. /E | Paperback
Simon & Schuster · 2000년 04월 03일
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Peter Lynch is America's number-one money manager. His mantra: Average investors can become experts in their own field and can pick winning stocks as effectively as Wall Street professionals by doing just a little research.

Now, in a new introduction written specifically for this edition of One Up on Wall Street, Lynch gives his take on the incredible rise of Internet stocks, as well as a list of twenty winning companies of high-tech '90s. That many of these winners are low-tech supports his thesis that amateur investors can continue to reap exceptional rewards from mundane, easy-to-understand companies they encounter in their daily lives.

Investment opportunities abound for the layperson, Lynch says. By simply observing business developments and taking notice of your immediate world -- from the mall to the workplace -- you can discover potentially successful companies before professional analysts do. This jump on the experts is what produces "tenbaggers," the stocks that appreciate tenfold or more and turn an average stock portfolio into a star performer.

The former star manager of Fidelity's multibillion-dollar Magellan Fund, Lynch reveals how he achieved his spectacular record. Writing with John Rothchild, Lynch offers easy-to-follow directions for sorting out the long shots from the no shots by reviewing a company's financial statements and by identifying which numbers really count. He explains how to stalk tenbaggers and lays out the guidelines for investing in cyclical, turnaround, and fast-growing companies.

Lynch promises that if you ignore the ups and downs of the market and the endless speculation about interest rates, in the long term (anywhere from five to fifteen years) your portfolio will reward you. This advice has proved to be timeless and has made One Up on Wall Street a number-one bestseller. And now this classic is as valuable in the new millennium as ever.

원서번역서 내용 엿보기



저자(글) Lynch, Peter

Peter Lynch is vice chairman of Fidelity Management & Research Company -- the investment advisor arm of Fidelity Investments -- and a member of the Board of Trustees of the Fidelity funds. Mr. Lynch was portfolio manager of Fidelity Magellan Fund, which was the best performing fund in the world under his leadership from May 1977 to May 1990. He is the co-author of the bestselling Beating the Street and Learn to Earn, a beginner's guide to the basics of investing and business. He lives in the Boston area.

저자(글) Rothchild, John

'타임Time', '포춘Fortune', '뉴욕타임스New York Times' 등에서 전문기고가로 활동했다. 피터 린치가 쓴 주식도서 '이기는 투자Beating The Street', '증권투자로 돈 버는 비결Learn to earn'에서도 공동저자로 집필에 참여했다. 저서로는 '바보는 돈 쓰는 법을 모른다A fool and his money and going for broke'가 있다.


  • Introduction to the Millennium Edition
    PROLOGUE: A Note from Ireland
    INTRODUCTION: The Advantages of Dumb Money

    PART I Preparing to Invest

    1. The Making of a Stockpicker
    2. The Wall Street Oxymorons
    3. Is This Gambling, or What?
    4. Passing the Mirror Test
    5. Is This a Good Market? Please Don't Ask

    PART II Picking Winners

    6. Stalking the Tenbagger
    7. I've Got It, I've Got It -- What Is It?
    8. The Perfect Stock, What a Deal!
    9. Stocks I'd Avoid
    10. Earnings, Earnings, Earnings
    11. The Two-Minute Drill
    12. Getting the Facts
    13. Some Famous Numbers
    14. Rechecking the Story
    15. The Final Checklist

    PART III The Long-term View

    16. Designing a Portfolio
    17. The Best Time to Buy and Sell
    18. The Twelve Silliest (and Most Dangerous) Things People Say About Stock Prices
    19. Options, Futures, and Shorts
    20. 50,000 Frenchmen Can Be Wrong

    EPILOGUE: Caught with My Pants Up

책 속으로

Anise C. Wallace
The New York Times

Mr. Lynch's investment record puts him in a league by himself.

출판사 서평

Introduction to the Millennium Edition

This book was written to offer encouragement and basic information to the individual investor. Who knew it would go through thirty printings and sell more than one million copies? As this latest edition appears eleven years beyond the first, I'm convinced that the same principles that helped me perform well at the Fidelity Magellan Fund still apply to investing in stocks today.

It's been a remarkable stretch since One Up on Wall Street hit the bookstores in 1989. I left Magellan in May, 1990, and pundits said it was a brilliant move. They congratulated me for getting out at the right time -- just before the collapse of the great bull market. For the moment, the pessimists looked smart. The country's major banks flirted with insolvency, and a few went belly up. By early fall, war was brewing in Iraq. Stocks suffered one of their worst declines in recent memory. But then the war was won, the banking system survived, and stocks rebounded.

Some rebound! The Dow is up more than fourfold since October, 1990, from the 2,400 level to 11,000 and beyond -- the best decade for stocks in the twentieth century. Nearly 50 percent of U.S. households own stocks or mutual funds, up from 32 percent in 1989. The market at large has created $25 trillion in new wealth, which is on display in every city and town. If this keeps up, somebody will write a book called The Billionaire Next Door.

More than $4 trillion of that new wealth is invested in mutual funds, up from $275 billion in 1989. The fund bonanza is okay by me, since I managed a fund. But it also must mean a lot of amateur stockpickers did poorly with their picks. If they'd done better on their own in this mother of all bull markets, they wouldn't have migrated to funds to the extent they have. Perhaps the information contained in this book will set some errant stockpickers on a more profitable path.

Since stepping down at Magellan, I've become an individual investor myself. On the charitable front, I raise scholarship money to send inner-city kids of all faiths to Boston Catholic schools. Otherwise, I work part-time at Fidelity as a fund trustee and as an adviser/trainer for young research analysts. Lately my leisure time is up at least thirtyfold, as I spend more time with my family at home and abroad.

Enough about me. Let's get back to my favorite subject: stocks. From the start of this bull market in August 1982, we've seen the greatest advance in stock prices in U.S. history, with the Dow up fifteenfold. In Lynch lingo that's a "fifteenbagger." I'm accustomed to finding fifteenbaggers in a variety of successful companies, but a fifteenbagger in the market at large is a stunning reward. Consider this: From the top in 1929 through 1982, the Dow produced only a fourbagger: up from 248 to 1,046 in a half century! Lately stock prices have risen faster as they've moved higher. It took the Dow 8 1/3 years to double from 2,500 to 5,000, and only 3 1/2 years to double from 5,000 to 10,000. From 1995-99 we saw an unprecedented five straight years where stocks returned 20 percent plus. Never before has the market recorded more than two back-to-back 20 percent gains.

Wall Street's greatest bull market has rewarded the believers and confounded the skeptics to a degree neither side could have imagined in the doldrums of the early 1970s, when I first took the helm at Magellan. At that low point, demoralized investors had to remind themselves that bear markets don't last forever, and those with patience held on to their stocks and mutual funds for the fifteen years it took the Dow and other averages to regain the prices reached in the mid-1960s. Today it's worth reminding ourselves that bull markets don't last forever and that patience is required in both directions.

On page 280 of this book I say the breakup of ATT in 1984 may have been the most significant stock market development of that era. Today it's the Internet, and so far the Internet has passed me by. All along I've been technophobic. My experience shows you don't have to be trendy to succeed as an investor. In fact, most great investors I know (Warren Buffett, for starters) are technophobes. They don't own what they don't understand, and neither do I. I understand Dunkin' Donuts and Chrysler, which is why both inhabited my portfolio, I understand banks, savings-and-loans, and their close relative, Fannie Mae. I don't visit the Web. I've never surfed on it or chatted across it. Without expert help (from my wife or my children, for instance) I couldn't find the Web.

Over the Thanksgiving holidays in 1997, I shared eggnog with a Web-tolerant friend in New York. I mentioned that my wife, Carolyn, liked the mystery novelist Dorothy Sayers. The friend sat down at a nearby computer and in a couple of clicks pulled up the entire list of Sayers titles, plus customer reviews and the one-to five-star ratings (on the literary Web sites, authors are rated like fund managers). I bought four Sayers novels for Carolyn, picked the gift wrapping, typed in our home address, and crossed one Christmas gift off my list. This was my introduction to Amazon.com.

Later on you'll read how I discovered some of my best stocks through eating or shopping, sometimes long before other professional stock hounds came across them. Since Amazon existed in cyberspace, and not in suburban mall space, I ignored it. Amazon wasn't beyond my comprehension -- the business was as understandable as a dry cleaner's. Also, in 1997 it was reasonably priced relative to its prospects, and it was well-financed. But I wasn't flexible enough to see opportunity in this new guise. Had I bothered to do the research, I would have seen the huge market for this sort of shopping and Amazon's ability to capture it. Alas, I didn't. Meanwhile, Amazon was up tenfold (a "tenbagger" in Lynch parlance) in 1998 alone.

Amazon is one of at least five hundred "dot.com" stocks that have performed miraculous levitations. In high-tech and dot.com circles, it's not unusual for a newly launched public offering to rise tenfold in less time than it takes Stephen King to pen another thriller. These investments don't require much patience. Before the Internet came along, companies had to grow their way into the billion-dollar ranks. Now they can reach billion-dollar valuations before they've turned a profit or, in some cases, before they've collected any revenues. Mr. Market (a fictional proxy for stocks in general) doesn't wait for a newborn Web site to prove itself in real life the way, say, Wal-Mart or Home Depot proved themselves in the last generation.

With today's hot Internet stocks, fundamentals are old hat. (The term old hat is old hat in itself, proving that I'm old hat for bringing it up.) The mere appearance of a dot and a com, and the exciting concept behind it, is enough to convince today's optimists to pay for a decade's worth of growth and prosperity in advance. Subsequent buyers pay escalating prices based on the futuristic "fundamentals," which improve with each uptick.

Judging by the Maserati sales in Silicon Valley, dot.coms are highly rewarding to entrepreneurs who take them public and early buyers who make timely exits. But I'd like to pass along a word of caution to people who buy shares after they've levitated. Does it make sense to invest in a dot.com at prices that already reflect years of rapid earnings growth that may or may not occur? By the way I pose this, you've already figured out my answer is "no." With many of these new issues, the stock price doubles, triples, or even quadruples on the first day of trading. Unless your broker can stake your claim to a meaningful allotment of shares at the initial offering price -- an unlikely prospect since Internet offerings are more coveted, even, than Super Bowl tickets -- you'll miss a big percent of the gain. Perhaps you'll miss the entire gain, since some dot.coms hit high prices on the first few trading sessions that they never reach again.

If you feel left out of the dot.com jubilee, remind yourself that very few dot.com investors benefit from the full ride. It's misleading to measure the progress of these stocks from the offering price that most buyers can't get. Those who are allotted shares are lucky to receive more than a handful.

In spite of the instant gratification that surrounds me, I've continued to invest the old-fashioned way. I own stocks where results depend on ancient fundamentals: a successful company enters new markets, its earnings rise, and the share price follows along. Or a flawed company turns itself around. The typical big winner in the Lynch portfolio (I continue to pick my share of losers, too!) generally takes three to ten years or more to play out.

Owing to the lack of earnings in dot.com land, most dot.coms can't be rated using the standard price/earnings yardstick. In other words, there's no "e" in the all-important "p/e" ratio. Without a "p/e" ratio to track, investors focus on the one bit of data that shows up everywhere: the stock price! To my mind, the stock price is the least useful information you can track, and it's the most widely tracked. When One Up was written in 1989, a lone ticker tape ran across the bottom of the Financial News Network. Today you can find a ticker tape on a variety of channels, while others display little boxes that showcase the Dow, the S&P 500, and so forth. Channel surfers can't avoid knowing where the market closed. On the popular Internet portals, you can click on your customized portfolio and get the latest gyrations for every holding. Or you can get stock prices on 800 lines, pagers, and voice mail.

To me, this barrage of price tags sends the wrong message. If my favorite Internet company sells for $30 a share, and yours sells for $10, then people who focus on price would say that mine is the superior company. This is a dangerous delusion. What Mr. Market pays for a stock today or next week doesn't tell you which company has the best chance to succeed two to three years down the information superhighway. If you can follow only one bit of data, follow the earnings -- assuming the company in question has earnings. As you'll see in this text, I subscribe to the crusty notion that sooner or later earnings make or break an investment in equities. What the stock price does today, tomorrow, or next week is only a distraction.

The Internet is far from the first innovation that changed the world. The railroad, telephone, the car, the airplane, and the TV can all lay claim to revolutionary effects on the average life, or at least on the prosperous top quarter of the global population. These new industries spawned new companies, only a few of which survived to dominate the field. The same thing likely will happen with the Internet. A big name or two will capture the territory, the way McDonald's did with burgers or Schlumberger did with oil services. Shareholders in those triumphant companies will prosper, while shareholders in the laggards, the has-beens, and the should-have-beens will lose money. Perhaps you'll be clever enough to pick the big winners that join the exclusive club of companies that earn $1 billion a year.

Though the typical dot.com has no earnings as yet, you can do a thumbnail analysis that gives a general idea of what the company will need to earn in the future to justify the stock price today. Let's take a hypothetical case: DotCom.com. First, you find the "market capitalization" ("market cap" for short) by multiplying the number of shares outstanding (let's say 100 million) by the current stock price (let's say $100 a share). One hundred million times $100 equals $10 billion, so that's the market cap for DotCom.com.

Whenever you invest in any company, you're looking for its market cap to rise. This can't happen unless buyers are paying higher prices for the shares, making your investment more valuable. With that in mind, before DotCom.com can turn into a tenbagger, its market cap must increase tenfold, from $10 billion to $100 billion. Once you've established this target market cap, you have to ask yourself: What will DotCom.com need to earn to support a $100 billion valuation? To get a ballpark answer, you can apply a generic price/earnings ratio for a fast-growing operation -- in today's heady market, let's say 40 times earnings.

Permit me a digression here. On page 170 I mention how wonderful companies become risky investments when people overpay for them, using McDonald's as exhibit A. In 1972 the stock was bid up to a precarious 50 times earnings. With no way to "live up to these expectations," the price fell from $75 to $25, a great buying opportunity at a "more realistic" 13 times earnings.

On the following page I also mention the bloated 500 times earnings shareholders paid for Ross Perot's Electronic Data Systems. At 500 times earnings, I noted, "it would take five centuries to make back your investment, if the EDS earnings stayed constant," Thanks to the Internet, 500 times earnings has lost its shock value, and so has 50 times earnings or, in our theoretical example, 40 times earnings for DotCom.com.

In any event, to become a $100 billion enterprise, we can guess that DotCom.com eventually must earn $2.5 billion a year. Only thirty-three U.S. corporations earned more than $2.5 billion in 1999, so for this to happen to DotCom.com, it will have to join the exclusive club of big winners, along with the likes of Microsoft. A rare feat, indeed.

I'd like to end this brief Internet discussion on a positive note. There are three ways to invest in this trend without having to buy into a hope and an extravagant market cap. The first is an offshoot of the old "picks and shovels" strategy: During the Gold Rush, most would-be miners lost money, but people who sold them picks, shovels, tents, and blue jeans (Levi Strauss) made a nice profit. Today, you can look for non-Internet companies that indirectly benefit from Internet traffic (package delivery is an obvious example); or you can invest in manufacturers of switches and related gizmos that keep the traffic moving.

The second is the so-called "free Internet play." That's where an Internet business is embedded in a non-Internet company with real earnings and a reasonable stock price. I'm not naming names -- you can do your own sleuthing -- but several intriguing free plays have come to my attention. In a typical situation, the company at large is valued, say, at $800 million in today's market, while its fledgling Internet operation is estimated to be worth $1 billion, before it has proven itself. If the Internet operation lives up to its promise, it could prove very rewarding -- that part of the company may be "spun off" so it trades as its own stock. Or, if the Internet venture doesn't do well, the fact that it's an adjunct to the company's regular line of work protects investors on the downside.

The third is the tangential benefit, where an old-fashioned "brick and mortar" business benefits from using the Internet to cut costs, streamline operations, become more efficient, and therefore more profitable. A generation ago, scanners were installed in supermarkets. This reduced pilferage, brought inventories under better control, and was a huge boon to supermarket chains.

Going forward, the Internet and its handmaidens will create some great success stories, but at this point we've mostly got great expectations and inefficient pricing. Companies valued at $500 million today may triumph, while companies valued at $10 billion may not be worth a dime. As expectations turn to reality, the winners will be more obvious than they are today. Investors who see this will have time to act on their "edge."

Back to Microsoft, a 100-bagger I overlooked. Along with Cisco and Intel, that high-tech juggernaut posted explosive earnings almost from the start. Microsoft went public in 1986 at 15 cents a share. Three years later you could buy a share for under $1, and from there it advanced eightyfold. (The stock has "split" several times along the way, so original shares never actually sold for 15 cents -- for further explanation, see the footnote on page 34.) If you took the Missouri "show me" approach and waited to buy Microsoft until it triumphed with Windows 95, you still made seven times your money. You didn't have to be a programmer to notice Microsoft everywhere you looked. Except in the Apple orchard, all new computers came equipped with the Microsoft operating system and Microsoft Windows. Apples were losing their appeal. The more computers that used Windows, the more the software guys wrote programs for Windows and not for Apple. Apple was squeezed into a corner, where it sold boxes to 7-10 percent of the market.

Meanwhile the box makers that ran Microsoft programs (Dell, Hewlett-Packard, Compaq, IBM, and so on) waged fierce price wars to sell more boxes. This endless skirmish hurt the box makers' earnings, but Microsoft was unaffected. Bill Gates's company wasn't in the box business; it sold the "gas" that ran the boxes.

Cisco is another marquee performer. The stock price is up 480-fold since it went public in 1990. I overlooked this incredible winner for the usual reasons, but a lot of people must have noticed it. Businesses at large hired Cisco to help them link their computers into networks; then colleges hired Cisco to computerize the dorms, Students, teachers, and visiting parents could have noticed this development. Maybe some of them went home, did the research, and bought the stock.

I mention Microsoft and Cisco to add contemporary examples to illustrate a major theme of this book. An amateur investor can pick tomorrow's big winners by paying attention to new developments at the workplace, the mall, the auto showrooms, the restaurants, or anywhere a promising new enterprise makes its debut. While I'm on the subject, a clarification is in order.

Charles Barkley, a basketball player noted for shooting from the lip, once claimed he was misquoted in his own autobiography. I don't claim to be misquoted in this book, but I've been misinterpreted on one key point. Here's my disclaimer.

Peter Lynch doesn't advise you to buy stock in your favorite store just because you like shopping in the store, nor should you buy stock in a manufacturer because it makes your favorite product or a restaurant because you like the food. Liking a store, a product, or a restaurant is a good reason to get interested in a company and put it on your research list, but it's not enough of a reason to own the stock! Never invest in any company before you've done the homework on the company's earnings prospects, financial condition, competitive position, plans for expansion, and so forth.

If you own a retail company, another key factor in the analysis is figuring out whether the company is nearing the end of its expansion phase -- what I call the "late innings" in its ball game. When a Radio Shack or a Toys "R" Us has established itself in 10 percent of the country, it's a far different prospect than having stores in 90 percent of the country. You have to keep track of where the future growth is coming from and when it's likely to slow down.

Nothing has occurred to shake my conviction that the typical amateur has advantages over the typical professional fund jockey. In 1989 the pros enjoyed quicker access to better information, but the information gap has closed. A decade ago amateurs could get information on a company in three ways: from the company itself, from Value Line or Standard & Poor's research sheets, or from reports written by in-house analysts at the brokerage firm where the amateurs kept an account. Often these reports were mailed from headquarters, and it took several days for the information to arrive.

Today an array of analysts' reports is available on-line, where any browser can call them up at will. News alerts on your favorite companies are delivered automatically to your e-mail address. You can find out if insiders are buying or selling or if a stock has been upgraded or downgraded by brokerage houses. You can use customized screens to search for stocks with certain characteristics. You can track mutual funds of all varieties, compare their records, find the names of their top ten holdings. You can click on to the "briefing book" heading that's attached to the on-line version of The Wall Street Journal and Barron's, and get a snapshot review of almost any publicly traded company. From there you can access "Zack's" and get a summary of ratings from all the analysts who follow a particular stock.

Again thanks to the Internet, the cost of buying and selling stocks has been drastically reduced for the small investor, the way it was reduced for institutional investors in 1975. On-line trading has pressured traditional brokerage houses to reduce commissions and transaction fees, continuing a trend that began with the birth of the discount broker two decades ago.

You may be wondering what's happened to my investing habits since I left Magellan. Instead of following thousands of companies, now I follow maybe fifty. (I continue to serve on investment committees at various foundations and charitable groups, but in all of these cases we hire portfolio managers and let them pick the stocks.) Trendy investors might think the Lynch family portfolio belongs in the New England Society of Antiquities. It contains some savings-and-loans that I bought at bargain-basement prices during a period when the S&Ls were unappreciated. These stocks have had a terrific run, and I'm still holding on to some of them. (Selling long-term winners subjects you to an IRS bear market -- a 20 percent tax on the proceeds.) I also own several growth companies that I've held since the 1980s, and a few since the 1970s. These businesses continue to prosper, yet the stocks still appear to be reasonably priced. Beyond that, I'm still harboring an ample supply of clunkers that sell for considerably less than the price I paid. I'm not keeping these disappointment companies because I'm stubborn or nostalgic. I'm keeping them because in each of these companies, the finances are in decent shape and there's evidence of better times ahead.

My clunkers remind me of an important point: You don't need to make money on every stock you pick. In my experience, six out of ten winners in a portfolio can produce a satisfying result. Why is this? Your losses are limited to the amount you invest in each stock (it can't go lower than zero), while your gains have no absolute limit. Invest $1,000 in a clunker and in the worst case, maybe you lose $1,000. Invest $1,000 in a high achiever, and you could make $10,000, $15,000, $20,000, and beyond over several years. All you need for a lifetime of successful investing is a few big winners, and the pluses from those will overwhelm the minuses from the stocks that don't work out.

Let me give you an update on two companies I don't own but that I wrote about in this book: Bethlehem Steel and General Electric. Both teach a useful lesson. I mentioned that shares of Bethlehem, an aging blue chip, had been in decline since 1960. A famous old company, it seems, can be just as unrewarding to investors as a shaky start-up. Bethlehem, once a symbol of American global clout, has continued to disappoint. It sold for $60 in 1958 and by 1989 had dropped to $17, punishing loyal shareholders as well as bargain hunters who thought they'd found a deal. Since 1989 the price has taken another fall, from $17 to the low single digits, proving that a cheap stock can always get cheaper. Someday, Bethlehem Steel may rise again. But assuming that will happen is wishing, not investing.

I recommended General Electric on a national TV show (it's been a tenbagger since), but in the book I mention that GE's size (market value $39 billion; annual profits $3 billion) would make it difficult for the company to increase those profits at a rapid rate. In fact, the company that brings good things to life has brought more upside to its shareholders than I'd anticipated. Against the odds and under the savvy leadership of Jack Welch, this corporate hulk has broken into a profitable trot. Welch, who recently announced his retirement, prodded GE's numerous divisions into peak performance, using excess cash to buy new businesses and to buy back shares. GE's triumph in the 1990s shows the importance of keeping up with a company's story.

Buying back shares brings up another important change in the market: the dividend becoming an endangered species. I write about its importance on page 204, but the old method of rewarding shareholders seems to have gone the way of the black-footed ferret. The bad part about the disappearing dividend is that regular checks in the mail gave investors an income stream and also a reason to hold on to stocks during periods when stock prices failed to reward. Yet in 1999 the dividend yield on the five hundred companies in the S&P 500 sank to an all-time low since World War II: near 1 percent.

It's true that interest rates are lower today than they were in 1989, so you'd expect yields on bonds and dividends on stocks to be lower. As stock prices rise, the dividend yield naturally falls. (If a $50 stock pays a $5 dividend, it yields 10 percent; when the stock price hits $100, it yields 5 percent.) Meanwhile companies aren't boosting their dividends the way they once did.

"What is so unusual," observed The New York Times (October 7, 1999), "is that the economy is doing so well even while companies are growing more reluctant to raise their dividends." In the not-so-distant past, when a mature, healthy company routinely raised the dividend, it was a sign of prosperity. Cutting a dividend or failing to raise it was a sign of trouble. Lately, healthy companies are skimping on their dividends and using the money to buy back their own shares, a la General Electric. Reducing the supply of shares increases the earnings per share, which eventually rewards shareholders, although they don't reap the reward until they sell.

If anybody's responsible for the disappearing dividend, it's the U.S. government, which taxes corporate profits, then taxes corporate dividends at the full rate, for so-called unearned income. To help their shareholders avoid this double taxation, companies have abandoned the dividend in favor of the buyback strategy, which boosts the stock price. This strategy subjects shareholders to increased capital gains taxes if they sell their shares, but long-term capital gains are taxed at half the rate of ordinary income taxes.

Speaking of long-term gains, in eleven years' worth of luncheon and dinner speeches, I've asked for a show of hands: "How many of you are long-term investors in stocks?" To date, the vote is unanimous -- everybody's a long-term investor, including day traders in the audience who took a couple of hours off. Long-term investing has gotten so popular, it's easier to admit you're a crack addict than to admit you're a short-term investor.

Stock market news has gone from hard to find (in the 1970s and early 1980s), then easy to find (in the late 1980s), then hard to get away from. The financial weather is followed as closely as the real weather: highs, lows, troughs, turbulence, and endless speculation about what's next and how to handle it. People are advised to think long-term, but the constant comment on every gyration puts people on edge and keeps them focused on the short term. It's a challenge not to act on it. If there were a way to avoid the obsession with the latest ups and downs, and check stock prices every six months or so, the way you'd check the oil in a car, investors might be more relaxed.

Nobody believes in long-term investing more passionately than I do, but as with the Golden Rule, it's easier to preach than to practice. Nevertheless, this generation of investors has kept the faith and stayed the course during all the corrections mentioned above. Judging by redemption calls from my old fund, Fidelity Magellan, the customers have been brilliantly complacent. Only a small percentage cashed out in the Saddam Hussein bear market of 1990.

Thanks to the day traders and some of the professional hedge fund managers, shares now change hands at an incredible clip. In 1989, three hundred million shares traded was a hectic session on the New York Stock Exchange; today, three hundred million is a sleepy interlude and eight hundred million is average. Have the day traders given Mr. Market the shakes? Does the brisk commerce in stock indexes have something to do with it? Whatever the cause (I see day traders as a major factor), frequent trading has made the stock markets more volatile. A decade ago stock prices moving up or down more than 1 percent in a single trading session was a rare occurrence. At present we get 1 percent moves several times a month.

By the way, the odds against making a living in the day-trading business are about the same as the odds against making a living at race-tracks, blackjack tables, or video poker. In fact, I think of day trading as at-home casino care. The drawback to the home casino is the paper-work. Make twenty trades per day, and you could end up with 5,000 trades a year, all of which must be recorded, tabulated, and reported to the IRS. So day trading is a casino that supports a lot of accountants.

People who want to know how stocks fared on any given day ask, Where did the Dow close? I'm more interested in how many stocks went up versus how many went down. These so-called advance/decline numbers paint a more realistic picture. Never has this been truer than in the recent exclusive market, where a few stocks advance while the majority languish. Investors who buy "undervalued" small stocks or midsize stocks have been punished for their prudence. People are wondering: How can the S&P 500 be up 20 percent and my stocks are down? The answer is that a few big stocks in the S&P 500 are propping up the averages.

For instance, in 1998 the S&P 500 index was up 28 percent overall, but when you take a closer look, you find out the 50 biggest companies in the index advanced 40 percent, while the other 450 companies hardly budged. In the NASDAQ market, home to the Internet and its supporting cast, the dozen or so biggest companies were huge winners, while the rest of the NASDAQ stocks, lumped together, were losers. The same story was repeated in 1999, where the elite group of winners skewed the averages and propped up the multitude of losers. More than 1,500 stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange lost money in 1999. This dichotomy is unprecedented. By the way, we tend to think the S&P 500 index is dominated by huge companies, while the NASDAQ is a haven for the smaller fry. By the late 1990s, NASDAQ's giants (Intel, Cisco, and a handful of others) dominated the NASDAQ index more than the S&P 500's giants dominated its index.

One industry that's teeming with small stocks is biotechnology. My high-tech aversion caused me to make fun of the typical biotech enterprise: $100 million in cash from selling shares, one hundred Ph.D.'s, 99 microscopes, and zero revenues. Recent developments inspire me to put in a good word for biotech -- not that amateurs should pick their biotech stocks out of a barrel, but that biotech in general could play the same role in the new century as electronics played in the last. Today a long list of biotechs have revenue, and three dozen or so turn a profit, with another fifty ready to do the same. Amgen has become a genuine biotech blue chip, with earnings of $1 billion plus. One of the numerous biotech mutual funds might be worth a long-term commitment for part of your money.

Market commentators fill


ISBN 9780743200400 ( 0743200403 )
발행(출시)일자 2000년 04월 03일
쪽수 304쪽
142 * 213 * 20 mm / 281 g
총권수 1권
언어 영어


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해외주문 시 유의사항

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Special order 주문 시 유의사항

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바로드림존에서 받기

  1. STEP 01
    매장 선택 후 바로드림 주문
  2. STEP 02
    준비완료 알림 시 매장 방문하기
  3. STEP 03
    바로드림존에서 주문상품 받기
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  • 각 매장 운영시간에 따라 바로드림 이용 시간이 달라질 수 있습니다.

수령 안내

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  • 바로드림 주문 후 재고가 실시간 변동되어, 수령 예상 시간에 수령이 어려울 수 있습니다.

취소/교환/반품 안내

  • 주문 후 7일간 찾아가지 않으시면, 자동으로 결제가 취소됩니다.
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사은품 관련 안내

  • 바로드림 서비스는 일부 1+1 도서, 경품, 사은품 등이 포함 되지 않습니다.

음반/DVD 바로드림시 유의사항

  • 음반/DVD 상품은 바로드림 주문 후 수령점 변경이 불가합니다. 주문 전 수령점을 꼭 확인해 주세요.
  • 사은품(포스터,엽서 등)은 증정되지 않습니다.
  • 커버이미지 랜덤발매 음반은 버전 선택이 불가합니다.
  • 광화문점,강남점,대구점,영등포점,잠실점은 [직접 찾아 바로드림존 가기], [바로드림존에서 받기] 로 주문시 음반 코너에서 수령확인이 가능합니다
  • 선물 받는 분의 휴대폰번호만 입력하신 후 결제하시면 받는 분 휴대폰으로 선물번호가 전달됩니다.
  • 문자를 받은 분께서는 마이 > 주문관리 > 모바일 선물내역 화면에서 선물번호와 배송지 정보를 입력하시면 선물주문이 완료되어 상품준비 및 배송이 진행됩니다.
  • 선물하기 결제하신 후 14일까지 받는 분이 선물번호를 등록하지 않으실 경우 주문은 자동취소 됩니다.
  • 또한 배송 전 상품이 품절 / 절판 될 경우 주문은 자동취소 됩니다.

바로드림 서비스 안내

  1. STEP 01
    매장 선택 후 바로드림 주문
  2. STEP 02
    준비완료 알림 시 매장 방문하기
  3. STEP 03
    바로드림존에서 주문상품 받기
  • 바로드림은 전국 교보문고 매장 및 교내서점에서 이용 가능합니다.
  • 잡지 및 일부 도서는 바로드림 이용이 불가합니다.
  • 각 매장 운영시간에 따라 바로드림 이용 시간이 달라질 수 있습니다.

수령 안내

  • 안내되는 재고수량은 서비스 운영 목적에 따라 상이할 수 있으므로 해당 매장에 문의해주시기 바랍니다.
  • 바로드림 주문 후 재고가 실시간 변동되어, 수령 예상시간에 수령이 어려울 수 있습니다.

취소/교환/반품 안내

  • 주문 후 7일간 찾아가지 않으시면, 자동으로 결제가 취소됩니다.
  • 취소된 금액은 결제수단의 승인취소 및 예치금으로 전환됩니다.
  • 교환/반품은 수령하신 매장에서만 가능합니다.

사은품 관련 안내

  • 바로드림 서비스는 일부 1+1 도서, 경품, 사은품 등이 포함되지 않습니다.

음반/DVD 바로드림시 유의사항

  • 음반/DVD 상품은 바로드림 주문 후 수령점 변경이 불가합니다. 주문 전 수령점을 꼭 확인해주세요.
  • 사은품(포스터,엽서 등)은 증정되지 않습니다.
  • 커버이미지 랜덤발매 음반은 버전 선택이 불가합니다.
  • 광화문점,강남점,대구점,영등포점,잠실점은 [직접 찾아 바로드림존 가기], [바로드림존에서 받기] 로 주문시 음반코너에서 수령확인이 가능합니다.
  1. STEP 01
    픽업박스에서 찾기 주문
  2. STEP 02
    도서준비완료 후 휴대폰으로 인증번호 전송
  3. STEP 03
    매장 방문하여 픽업박스에서 인증번호 입력 후 도서 픽업
  • 바로드림은 전국 교보문고 매장 및 교내서점에서 이용 가능합니다.
  • 잡지 및 일부 도서는 바로드림 이용이 불가합니다.
  • 각 매장 운영시간에 따라 바로드림 이용 시간이 달라질 수 있습니다.

수령 안내

  • 안내되는 재고수량은 서비스 운영 목적에 따라 상이할 수 있으므로 해당 매장에 문의해주시기 바랍니다.
  • 바로드림 주문 후 재고가 실시간 변동되어, 수령 예상시간에 수령이 어려울 수 있습니다.

취소/교환/반품 안내

  • 주문 후 7일간 찾아가지 않으시면, 자동으로 결제가 취소됩니다.
  • 취소된 금액은 결제수단의 승인취소 및 예치금으로 전환됩니다.
  • 교환/반품은 수령하신 매장에서만 가능합니다.

사은품 관련 안내

  • 바로드림 서비스는 일부 1+1 도서, 경품, 사은품 등이 포함되지 않습니다.

음반/DVD 바로드림시 유의사항

  • 음반/DVD 상품은 바로드림 주문 후 수령점 변경이 불가합니다. 주문 전 수령점을 꼭 확인해주세요.
  • 사은품(포스터,엽서 등)은 증정되지 않습니다.
  • 커버이미지 랜덤발매 음반은 버전 선택이 불가합니다.
  • 광화문점,강남점,대구점,영등포점,잠실점은 [직접 찾아 바로드림존 가기], [바로드림존에서 받기] 로 주문시 음반코너에서 수령확인이 가능합니다.

도서 소득공제 안내

  • 도서 소득공제란?

    • 2018년 7월 1일 부터 근로소득자가 신용카드 등으로 도서구입 및 공연을 관람하기 위해 사용한 금액이 추가 공제됩니다. (추가 공제한도 100만원까지 인정)
      • 총 급여 7,000만 원 이하 근로소득자 중 신용카드, 직불카드 등 사용액이 총급여의 25%가 넘는 사람에게 적용
      • 현재 ‘신용카드 등 사용금액’의 소득 공제한도는 300만 원이고 신용카드사용액의 공제율은 15%이지만, 도서·공연 사용분은 추가로 100만 원의 소득 공제한도가 인정되고 공제율은 30%로 적용
      • 시행시기 이후 도서·공연 사용액에 대해서는 “2018년 귀속 근로소득 연말 정산”시기(19.1.15~)에 국세청 홈택스 연말정산간소화 서비스 제공
  • 도서 소득공제 대상

    • 도서(내서,외서,해외주문도서), eBook(구매)
    • 도서 소득공제 대상 상품에 수반되는 국내 배송비 (해외 배송비 제외)
      • 제외상품 : 잡지 등 정기 간행물, 음반, DVD, 기프트, eBook(대여,학술논문), 사은품, 선물포장, 책 그리고 꽃
      • 상품정보의 “소득공제” 표기를 참고하시기 바랍니다.
  • 도서 소득공제 가능 결제수단

    • 카드결제 : 신용카드(개인카드에 한함)
    • 현금결제 : 예치금, 교보e캐시(충전에한함), 해피머니상품권, 컬쳐캐쉬, 기프트 카드, 실시간계좌이체, 온라인입금
    • 간편결제 : 교보페이, 네이버페이, 삼성페이, 카카오페이, PAYCO, 토스, CHAI
      • 현금결제는 현금영수증을 개인소득공제용으로 신청 시에만 도서 소득공제 됩니다.
      • 교보e캐시 도서 소득공제 금액은 교보eBook > e캐시 > 충전/사용내역에서 확인 가능합니다.
      • SKpay, 휴대폰 결제, 교보캐시는 도서 소득공제 불가
  • 부분 취소 안내

    • 대상상품+제외상품을 주문하여 신용카드 "2회 결제하기"를 선택 한 경우, 부분취소/반품 시 예치금으로 환원됩니다.

      신용카드 결제 후 예치금으로 환원 된 경우 승인취소 되지 않습니다.

  • 도서 소득공제 불가 안내

    • 법인카드로 결제 한 경우
    • 현금영수증을 사업자증빙용으로 신청 한 경우
    • 분철신청시 발생되는 분철비용

알림 신청

아래의 알림 신청 시 원하시는 소식을 받아 보실 수 있습니다.
알림신청 취소는 마이룸 > 알림신청내역에서 가능합니다.

One Up on Wall Street
How to Use What You Already Know to Make Money in the Market
2/EFireside. /E | Paperback
한달 후 리뷰
/ 좋았어요
작년까지만 해도 주식은 커녕 재테크에 관해 아무것도 모르다가 올해 주식 투자를 시작했다. 아무것도 모르고 초심자의 행운으로 분유값 정도를 벌고 나니, 조금 더 공부해보고 싶어져서 『초격차 투자법』을 구매했다.
작년까지만 해도 주식은 커녕 재테크에 관해 아무것도 모르다가 구매했어요! 저도 공부하고 싶어서 구매했어요~ 다같이 완독 도전해봐요! :)
작년까지만 해도 주식은 커녕 재테크에 관해 아무것도 모르다가 구매했어요! 저도 공부하고 싶어서 구매했어요~ 다같이 완독 도전해봐요! :)
작년까지만 해도 주식은 커녕 재테크에 관해 아무것도 모르다가 구매했어요! 저도 공부하고 싶어서 구매했어요~ 다같이 완독 도전해봐요! :)
작년까지만 해도 주식은 커녕 재테크에 관해 아무것도 모르다가 구매했어요! 저도 공부하고 싶어서 구매했어요~ 다같이 완독 도전해봐요! :)
이 구매자의 첫 리뷰 보기
/ 좋았어요
하루밤 사이 책한권을 읽은게 처음이듯 하다. 저녁나절 책을 집어든게 잘못이다. 마치 게임에 빠진 아이처럼 잠을 잘수없게 만든다. 결말이 어쩌면 당연해보이는 듯 하여도 헤어나올수 없는 긴박함이 있다. 조만간 영화화되어지지 않을까 예견해 본다. 책한권으로 등의 근육들이 오그라진 느낌에 아직도 느껴진다. 하루밤 사이 책한권을 읽은게 처음이듯 하다. 저녁나절 책을 집어든게 잘못이다. 마치 게임에 빠진 아이 처럼 잠을 잘수없게 만든다. 결말이 어쩌면 당연해보이는 듯 하여도 헤어나올수 없는 긴박함이 있다. 조만간 영화화되어지지 않을까..
작년까지만 해도 주식은 커녕 재테크에 관해 아무것도 모르다가 구매했어요! 저도 공부하고 싶어서 구매했어요~ 다같이 완독 도전해봐요! :)

신고 사유를 선택해주세요.
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외서 용어 안내

제본형태 용어 안내

[=Hardbound / Hardback / 양장본 / 하드커버]
보존을 위하여 딱딱한 표지로 제본된 도서
[=Paperbound / Softcover / 페이퍼백]
보급을 위하여 종이표지로 제본된 도서
Pocket Book
[=Mass Market Paperback / Pocket Size Book]
대중판매를 위한 염가도서. 페이퍼백보다도 저렴하며 사이즈가 작게 제본된 도서
Leather Bound
가죽으로 제본된 도서
Ring Binding
[=Spiral/Spring Binding]
연습장처럼 스프링으로 제본된 도서
도서관 대출용으로 견고하게 제본된 도서 School and Library Binding과 유사함
School and Library Binding
[=S/L Binding /School Library Binding / Library Binding]
교육기관/도서관 보관을 위해 견고하게 제본된 도서
Loose Leaf
페이지를 뺏다 끼웠다가 가능하도록 제본된 도서
Bath Book
목욕책/물놀이책. 비닐소재의 물놀이용 도서
Cloth Book
헝겊책. 인형처럼 헝겊으로 만들어진 도서
Flap Book
플랩북. 접힌 부분을 들추면 해당 내용과 연결되는 다른 그림이 나 내용이 들어있는 도서
Pop-Up Book
팝업북. 책장을 넘기면 페이지가 입체적으로 구성된 도서
Touch & Feel Book
촉감책. 직접 만지고 느낄 수 있도록 제작된 도서
고급 제본 형태로 주로 아트북에 사용됨
2nd, 2/E. 2 Edition
판수를 일컬음
International Edition
비영어권에서만 유통되는 염가판 도서. 주로 교재가 해당하며 미국 현지에서 출간되는 도서와 내용은 동일함
Reprint Edition
[= Reissue]
재판. 개정된 내용 없이 인쇄만 다시 한 도서
Revised Edition
[=Updated Edition]
개정판. 내용 또는 조판체제가 개정된 도서
Enlarged Edition
[=Enhanced Edition]
증보판. 구판의 내용에 새로운 것을 추가하여 재출판한 도서
Abridged Edition
축약판 (↔Unabridged Edition / 비축약판 ) 주로 오디오북에 사용
Unabridged Edition
비축약판 (↔Abridged Edition / 축약판 ) 주로 오디오북에 사용
POD (Print On Demand)
[=OD板 (일본도서)]
품절 및 절판되어 구할 수 없는 도서를 전자파일 형태로 보유, 주문 시 책의 형태로 인쇄, 제본하여 제공하는 도서

인쇄 상태가 좋지 않으며 오리지널 도서에 들어있는 그림이나 표 부록 등은 포함되지 않음
Large Print Edition
노약자, 시각장애인 등을 위하여 큰 글씨로 인쇄된 도서
Media Tie-In Edition
영화/드라마 등의 영상매체와 관련되어 제작된 도서
Rough Cut Edition
[=Deckle Edge]
책장의 모서리가 거칠게 제작된 도서로 보관을 위한 소장용 도서
Anniversary Edition
기념특별판. 내용은 동일하나 제본형태나 사진/저자사인 등 부가적인 부분이 추가된 특별판
Deluxe Edition
호화판으로 일반판에 제본형태나 추가 부록 등이 추가된 특별판
PSC Edition
Access Code가 포함된 도서. 주로 교재의 경우 책마다 부여된 Access Code로 인터넷에 접속하여 부교재 및 내용 확인 숙제 등의 정보 제공이 가능한 도서
Bi-Lingual Edition
두개의 언어로 구성된 도서
Multilingual Edition
다중 언어로 구성된 도서
Translation Edition
번역판. 원서를 다른 언어로 번역한 도서
문고판 (일본도서)
단행본과 내용은 동일하나 보급을 위해 가격이 저렴하고 사이즈가 작게 출시된 판형. 사이즈 약 105mm x 150mm
신서판 (일본도서)
휴대를 위하여 사이즈가 작게 출시된 판형 사이즈 약 105mm x 173mm

교재 관련 용어

Answer Key
교재 속 문제에 대한 답이 포함
특정 분야 또는 주제에 관한 참고용 서적
Laboratory Manual
교재에 대한 실험 매뉴얼
Solution Manual
교재에 대한 해답풀이가 포함
Study Guide
교재에 대한 요약 및 해설이 포함
Teacher Edition
교재에 대한 교사용 지도서
교재에 대한 연습문제가 포함


  • A3 [297×420mm]
  • A4 [210×297mm]
  • A5 [148×210mm]
  • A6 [105×148mm]
  • B4 [257×364mm]
  • B5 [182×257mm]
  • B6 [128×182mm]
  • 8C [8절]
  • 기타 [가로×세로]
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