Game Theory : A Non-Technical Introduction to the Analysis of Strategy

PA /E

McCain, Roger A., Ph.D. 저자(글)

Cengage · 2003년 09월 01일

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저자(글) McCain, Roger A., Ph.D.

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• 
  Preface xiii
  Part 1 FUNDAMENTALS 1(30)
  Chapter 1 Conflict, Strategy, and Games 2(14)
  The Spanish Rebellion: Puffin' the Hurt on Hirtuleius 2(3)
  Game Theory Emerges 5(2)
  A Closer Look: John vonNeumann 5(1)
  A Closer Look: Oskar Morgenstern 6(1)
  Game Theory, Neoclassical Economics, and Mathematics 6(1)
  What Does This Have to Do with Games? 7(2)
  A Closer Look: Albert Tucker 9(1)
  The Prisoner's Dilemma 9(2)
  Games in Normal and Extensive Form 11(1)
  John Nash's Problem in the Movie 12(1)
  A Scientific Metaphor 13(1)
  A Business Case 13(1)
  Summary 14(1)
  Exercises and Discussion Questions 15(1)
  Chapter 2 Games in Extensive and Normal Form 16(15)
  Representation in Normal Form: A Business Case 16(4)
  Examining the Normal Form 20(5)
  The Spanish Rebellion 21(1)
  The Dictator Game 21(4)
  The Prisoner's Dilemma in Extensive Form 25(1)
  An Example from Military History 26(1)
  Summary 27(1)
  Exercises and Discussion Questions 28(3)
  Part 2 NONCOOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIA IN NORMAL FORM GAMES 31(148)
  Chapter 3 Dominant Strategies and Social Dilemmas 32(13)
  The Dumping Game 32(2)
  Dominant Strategies 34(1)
  Social Dilemmas and Cooperative Solutions 35(1)
  Collaborative Product Development 36(1)
  A Closer Look: George Stigler 37(1)
  Cooperative and Noncooperative Games Yet Again 37(1)
  A Political Game 38(2)
  Games with More than Two Strategies 40(1)
  A Textbook-Writing Game 41(1)
  Summary 42(1)
  Exercises and Discussion Questions 42(3)
  Chapter 4 Nash Equilibrium 45(15)
  A Textbook-Writing Game, Continued 45(2)
  A Closer Look: John Forbes Nash 45(2)
  Nash Equilibrium 47(1)
  Location, Location, Location 48(2)
  Heuristic Methods of Finding Nash Equilibria 50(1)
  Choosing Radio Formats 51(2)
  The Heave-Ho Game 53(1)
  A Closer Look: Thomas C. Schelling 53(1)
  A Closer Look: The Basis of a Schelling Point 54(1)
  Market Day 54(1)
  That Movie, Again 55(1)
  A Closer Look: Refinements of Nash Equilibrium 56(1)
  An Escape-Evasion Game 56(1)
  Summary 57(1)
  Exercises and Discussion Questions 58(2)
  Chapter 5 Some Classical Cases in Game Theory 60(11)
  A Quiz Game 60(3)
  A Closer Look: Augustin Cournot 63(1)
  The Maximin Solution 63(2)
  A Closer Look: Constant Numbers 64(1)
  The Significance of Zero-Sum Games 65(1)
  The Battle of the Sexes 66(1)
  Chicken 67(1)
  Hawk vs. Dove 67(1)
  Expressing Payoffs in Ordinal Numbers 68(2)
  Summary 70(1)
  Exercises and Discussion Questions 70(1)
  Chapter 6 Three-Person Games 71(14)
  An International Alliance 71(3)
  A Closer Look 73(1)
  A "Spoiler" in a Political Game 74(1)
  A Closer Look: John Maynard Keynes 75(1)
  Stock Advising 75(1)
  A Crowding Game 76(2)
  A Closer Look 78(1)
  A Public Goods Contribution Game 78(2)
  Summary 80(1)
  Exercises and Discussion Questions 81(4)
  Chapter 7 Probability and Game Theory 85(16)
  Probability 85(2)
  Expected Value 87(1)
  A Closer Look: Fortuna 88(1)
  Nature as a Player 88(1)
  An Example from Naval Conflict 89(2)
  Risk Aversion 91(2)
  Expected Utility 93(3)
  Summary 96(1)
  Appendix A: Measuring Utility 97(1)
  A Closer Look: Reverend Thomas Bayes 98(1)
  Appendix B: Bayes Rule 98(1)
  A Closer Look: John Harsanyi 99(1)
  Exercises and Discussion Questions 99(2)
  Chapter 8 Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria 101(15)
  Keeping Them Honest in Baseball 101(4)
  A Closer Look: Thinking It Through 104(1)
  Pure and Mixed Strategies 105(1)
  A Blue-Light Special 106(1)
  Equilibria with Mixed and Pure Strategies 107(2)
  Graphics for Mixed Strategies 109(3)
  Summary 112(1)
  Exercises and Discussion Questions 113(3)
  Chapter 9 Advanced Topics in Noncooperative Equilibrium 116(15)
  The Location Game, Again 116(3)
  Iterated Elimination of Dominated Strategies 119(2)
  Refinement: A Trembling Hand 121(1)
  A Confession Game 122(2)
  A Symmetrical Noncooperative Solution to the Blonde Problem 124(2)
  The Nathan Detroit Dilemma 126(3)
  Summary 129(1)
  Exercises and Discussion Questions 129(2)
  Chapter 10 Duopoly Strategies and Prices 131(27)
  Cournot Models 131(4)
  Nash Equilibrium in Cournot Models 135(2)
  Bertrand and Edgeworth 137(2)
  A Mixed Strategy Pricing Game 139(4)
  Applicability 143(1)
  Summary 144(1)
  Appendix A: A Mathematical Treatment of the Cournot Model 144(4)
  Appendix B: A Calculus-Based Mixed Strategy Pricing Model and Business Case 148(1)
  The Large Turbine Generator Industry 149(7)
  Assumptions about Cost 150(4)
  The Math 154(2)
  Exercises and Discussion Questions 156(2)
  Chapter 11 N-Person Games 158(21)
  The Queuing Game 158(2)
  Simplifying Assumptions for N-Person Games 160(2)
  Games with Many Participants: Proportional Games 162(3)
  Hawk vs. Dove, Revisited 165(2)
  Supply, Demand, and Tattonement 167(3)
  Keynesian Economics and Coordination Problems 170(2)
  Pros and Cons of the Simplifying Assumptions 172(1)
  Summary 173(1)
  Exercises and Discussion Questions 174(5)
  Part 3 COOPERATIVE SOLUTIONS 179(32)
  Chapter 12 Elements of Cooperative Games 180(21)
  Buy My Bike? 180(3)
  Credible Commitment 183(1)
  A Real Estate Development 184(3)
  A Closer Look 187(1)
  Solution Set 187(1)
  A Closer Look 188(1)
  The Core 188(1)
  Carpool 189(3)
  Some Political Coalitions 192(3)
  Another Look at the International Alliance Game 195(1)
  Summary 196(1)
  Exercises and Discussion Questions 197(4)
  Chapter 13 Applications of the Core to Economics 201(10)
  The Market Game 201(1)
  The Core of a Two-Person Exchange Game 202(3)
  The Core with More than Two Pairs of Traders 205(4)
  A Closer Look: Cooperation and Competition 209(1)
  The Core of a Public Goods Contribution Game 209(2)
  Monopoly and Regulation 211(4)
  Summary 215(1)
  Exercises and Discussion Questions 216
  Part 4 SEQUENTIAL GAMES 211(74)
  Chapter 14 Sequential Games 218(19)
  Strategic Investment to Deter Entry 218(3)
  Concepts for Sequential Games 221(2)
  The Spanish Rebellion, Again 223(2)
  Nash and Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 225(1)
  The Centipede Game 226(1)
  Going Coconutty 227(3)
  A Closer Look: The Austrian School 228(2)
  Counterattack 230(1)
  Summary 231(1)
  Exercises and Discussion Questions 232(5)
  Chapter 15 Imbedded Games 237(18)
  Planning Doctoral Study 237(3)
  A Closer Look: Nested and Imbedded Games 240(1)
  The Maltese Falcon 240(3)
  The Centipede Solved 243(2)
  Counterattack Revisited 245(1)
  Why Are There Strikes? 245(4)
  Summary 249(1)
  Exercises and Discussion Questions 250(5)
  Chapter 16 Repeated Play 255(15)
  The Campers' Dilemma 255(3)
  Pressing the Shirts 258(5)
  A Closer Look: Reinhard Selten 262(1)
  The Chain Store Paradox 263(1)
  Terrorism 263(4)
  A Closer Look 266(1)
  Summary 267(1)
  Exercises and Discussion Questions 267(3)
  Chapter 17 Indefinitely Repeated Play 270(15)
  A Repeated Effort Dilemma 270(3)
  The Discount Factor 273(1)
  A Closer Look 274(1)
  The Campers' Dilemma Solved 274(3)
  Poison Gas 277(2)
  A Closer Look 279(1)
  Collusive Pricing 279(2)
  Errors 281(1)
  Summary 282(1)
  Exercises and Discussion Questions 282(3)
  Part 5 SELECTED APPLICATIONS 285(86)
  Chapter 18 Game Theory, Law, and Social Mechanism Design 286(15)
  Liability 287(3)
  Grading Team Projects 290(3)
  A Closer Look 293(1)
  The Paradox of Benevolent Authority 293(3)
  Application: Monetary Authority 296(1)
  Summary 297(1)
  Exercises and Discussion Questions 298(3)
  Chapter 19 Voting Games 301(19)
  Party! Party! Party! 301(3)
  The Theme for the Party 304(1)
  Strategic Voting 305(1)
  Voting Problems and Criteria 306(2)
  A Closer Look: The Marquis De Condorcet 307(1)
  A Closer Look: Kenneth Arrow 307(1)
  Alternative Voting Schemes 308(2)
  A Closer Look: The Enlightenment 309(1)
  A Closer Look: De Borda and the Borda Count 309(1)
  Case: The Finnish Presidential Election 310(2)
  Case: An American Presidential Election 312(2)
  Case: The American Presidential Election of 2000 314(3)
  Summary 317(1)
  Exercises and Discussion Questions 317(3)
  Chapter 20 Games and Experiments 320(16)
  A Prisoner's Dilemma Experiment 320(2)
  Prisoner's Dilemma Results 322(2)
  A Mixed Experiment 324(2)
  Ultimatum Games 326(1)
  Centipede Games and Reciprocity 327(2)
  Work to Be Done (Framing) 329(1)
  Where We Have Arrived 330(1)
  Business Application: Reciprocity in the Employment Relationship 331(2)
  Summary 333(1)
  Exercises and Discussion Questions 333(3)
  Chapter 21 Auctions 336(18)
  A Camera Auction 336(3)
  Efficiency 339(1)
  A Closer Look 340(1)
  The eBay Example 340(5)
  Auctions: Kinds and Frames 345(2)
  A Closer Look: William S. Vickery 346(1)
  The Winner's Curse 347(1)
  An Auction for Two Complementary Items 348(2)
  Choosing Auction Forms 350(1)
  Some Experimental Findings: Individual Private Values 351(1)
  Pure Common Values 351(1)
  Summary 352(1)
  Exercises and Discussion Questions 352(2)
  Chapter 22 Evolution and Boundedly Rational Learning 354(17)
  Hawk vs. Dove 354(3)
  A Closer Look: John Maynard Smith 356(1)
  A Sewage Game 357(2)
  Bounded Rationality 359(1)
  A Closer Look: Herbert Simon 360(1)
  Informationally (Almost) Efficient Markets 360(4)
  Evolution and a Repeated Social Dilemma 364(1)
  Tit-for-Tat, Reciprocity, and the Evolution of the Human Species 365(3)
  A Closer Look: Robert Axelrod and the Axelrod Tournament 366(2)
  Summary 368(1)
  Exercises and Discussion Questions 368(3)
  Glossary 371(12)
  Index 383

기본정보

ISBN	9780324175721 ( 0324175728 )
발행(출시)일자	2003년 09월 01일
쪽수	준비중
언어	영어